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# **OFFICE OF PETITIONS**

In re Application of Naoya Katoh et al. Application No. 07/447,078 Patent No. 4,953,031 Filed: December 7, 1989 Issue Date: August 28, 1990 Attorney Docket Number: 35675 Title: ELECTRONIC BLACKBOARD HAVING IMAGE DISPLAY AND PRINT FUNCTIONS

DECISION ON RENEWED PETITION UNDER 37 C.F.R. §1.378(E)

This is a decision on the renewed petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e), filed on October 27, 2005, requesting reconsideration of a prior decision pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b)1, which refused to accept the delayed payment of maintenances fee for the above-referenced patent, and the renewed petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.183 to waive Rule §1.378(e), filed on March 9, 2006.

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<sup>1</sup> Any petition to accept an unavoidably delayed payment of a maintenance fee filed under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b) must include:

(1) The required maintenance fee set forth in 37 C.F.R. §1.20 (e) - (g);

- (2) The surcharge set forth in 37 C.F.R. §1.20(i)(1), and;
- (3) A showing that the delay was unavoidable since reasonable care was taken to ensure that the maintenance fee would be paid timely and that the petition was filed promptly after the patentee was notified of, or otherwise became aware of, the expiration of the patent. The showing must enumerate the steps taken to ensure timely payment of the maintenance fee, the date and the manner in which patentee became aware of the expiration of the patent, and the steps taken to file the petition promptly.

The present patent issued on August 28, 1990. The grace period for paying the 3½-year maintenance fee provided in 37 C.F.R. §1.362(e) expired at midnight on August 28, 1994, with no payment received. Accordingly, the patent expired on August 28, 1994 at midnight. On July 29, 2005, Petitioner's representative submitted a petition pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b), to revive the above-identified application. This petition was dismissed via the mailing of a decision on August 31, 2005. A renewed petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e) was timely received on October 31, 2005, along with the required payment of the petition fee. On November 30, 2005, Petitioner's representative filed a request for expedited handling and a petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.183 to waive the two-month period for response, along with an amendment to the renewed petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e). On January 5, 2006, a decision was mailed, which granted the petition to expedite and dismissed the petition to waive 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e). On March 9, 2006, Petitioner's representative submitted a renewed petition to waive this rule.

With the present renewed petitions, Petitioner's representative has included declarations from Messrs. Dunham, Horowitz, Maioli, and Phillips and Mses. Widenhouse, Barbee, Bernstein, Farnacci, and Larmon, along with a plurality of exhibits.

It is noted that the amended declaration of Mr. Phillips does not appear to be associated with the present patent, in that the header indicates that it is associated with patent number 5,181,195 (07/700,866).

It is noted that Petitioner's representative has filed substantially similar petitions in the patents which are associated with application numbers 07/110,452, 07/116,208, 07/127,279, 07/430,134, 07/447,078, 07/556,443, 07/588,715, 07/597,332, 07/641,681, 07/691,817, 07/700,866, 07/789,448, 07/795,791, and 08/432,901.

The request to accept the delayed payment of the maintenance fees associated with this patent is **DENIED**<sup>2</sup>.

The present patent issued on August 28, 1990. The grace period for paying the 3½-year maintenance fee provided in 37 C.F.R. §1.362(e) expired at midnight on August 28, 1994, with no

<sup>2</sup> This decision may be regarded as a final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. \$704 for the purposes of seeking judicial review. See MPEP 1002.02.

payment received. Accordingly, the patent expired on August 28, 1994 at midnight. On July 29, 2005, Petitioner's representative submitted a petition pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b), to revive the above-identified application. This petition was dismissed via the mailing of a decision on August 31, 2005. On November 30, 2005, Petitioner's representative filed a request for expedited handling and a petition to waive the two-month period for response. A renewed petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e) was timely received on October 27, 2005, along with the required payment of the petition fee. Petitioner's representative timely submitted a request for expedited handling, and a petition to waive the two-month period for response. On November 30, 2005, an amendment to the renewed petition was received. On January 5, 2006, a decision was mailed, which granted the petition to expedite and dismissed the petition to waive C.F.R. §1.378(e). On March 9, 2006, Petitioner's representative submitted a renewed petition to waive this rule.

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# The petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.183 to waive C.F.R. §1.378(e) so that material may be presented subsequent to the expiration of the two-month period for response.

Petitioner's representative seeks the waiver of the two-month period for response to the dismissal of the original petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b) so that additional evidence can be introduced into the record after the passing of the period for response<sup>3</sup>. The previous decision indicated that it would be presumed that Petitioner's representative received the decision on the original petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b) shortly after the date on which it had been mailed, as Petitioner's representative is located in New York City, which is in fairly close proximity to Alexandria.

Petitioner's representative has indicated with this latest round of submissions that this presumption is incorrect. Petitioner's representative has alleged that none of the decisions on the original petitions were received by Petitioner's representative, and Petitioner's representative engaged a private service in Arlington to obtain copies of the same. As such, Petitioner's representative was only provided with a period of one month with which to prepare a response for these petitions.

<sup>3</sup> Similar requests were made in application numbers 07/116,208, 07/127,279, 07/447,078, 07/588,715, 07/691,817, 07/700,866, and 07/789,448.

Petitioner's representative filed a plurality of petitions which are related to one another. None of these petitions indicated that Petitioner's representative had filed related petitions in other patents. Therefore, it was left entirely up to the Office to discover these related petitions, and it took some time to discover the related petitions, gather the file wrappers, and issue decisions. This explains why some decisions on the original petitions were mailed as early as August of 2005, and others were mailed as late as January of 2006.

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There are essentially two groupings of petitions – applications where Petitioner's representative timely submitted all of his evidence, and applications where Petitioner's representative failed to provide all of his evidence in a timely manner. Petitioner's representative has asserted that the decisions which were not received were mailed to an incorrect address.

There are eight petitions which involve decisions which were returned to the Office. Each of the files has been reviewed, and there are two of them in which a change of address has been located in the file  $(07/116,208^4 \text{ and } 07/127,279^5)$ , and it is clear that the change of address was neither entered nor effectuated. The Office regrets this error. In the remaining six files  $(07/447,078^6, 07/588,715^7, 07/641,681^8, 07/691,817^9,$  $07/700,866^{10}, and 07/789,448^{11})$ , no change of address has been located in the file.

4 The change of Address, received on October 24, 2005, has been located in file. The decision on petitions under 1.182 and 1.183, was mailed to "c/o Cooper & Dunham, Lewis H. Eslinger, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York NY 10112" on January 4, 2006, was returned on January 10, 2006. 5 The change of Address, received on October 24, 2005, has been located in file. The decision on the petitions under 1.182 and 1.183, was mailed on January 5, 2006 to "Eslinger & Pelton, 30 Rockefeller Plaza' #37fl, New York NY 10112," and was returned on January 19, 2006 6 The decision on original petition under 1.378(b) was mailed on August 31, 2005 to "Cooper & Dunham, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York NY 10112," and returned November 4, 2005. The decision on petitions under 1.182 and 1.183, mailed January 5, 2006, was returned on January 19, 2006. 7 The decision on the original petition under 1.378(b) was mailed on August 31, 2005 to "Cooper & Dunham, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York NY 10112," and returned on September 19, 2005. 8 The decision on original petition under 1.378(b) was mailed on October 27, 2005, to "Lewis H. Eslinger, Cooper And Dunham, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, 37th Floor, New York NY 10112," and was returned November 3, 2005. 9 There is no evidence that any decision was ever returned. The two decisions were mailed to "Cooper & Dunham, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York NY 10112." 10 The decision on petitions under 1.182 and 1.183 was mailed on January 4.

2006 to "Lewis H. Eslinger, Esq., Cooper & Dunham, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, 37th

Floor, New York, NY 10112," and was returned on January 11, 2006.

In an attempt to establish that these particular mailings were not received, Petitioner's representative has provided copies of his docket reports, per <u>Delgar v. Schulyer</u>, 172 USPQ 513 (D.D.C. 1971). Ordinarily, this would cause the Office to be more inclined to believe Petitioner's representative's assertion that the mailings were not received. However, Mr. Maioli has admitted that he received at least one of these mailings, but ignored this mailing for the better part of a month. There are 8 applications for which Petitioner's representative has requested that 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e) be waived: 07/116,208, 07/127,279, 07/447,078, 07/588,715, 07/641,681, 07/691,817, 07/700,866, and 07/789,448.

It appears that Mr. Maioli did indeed receive a copy of the decision on the petition associated with Patent No. 4,870,544 (Application No. 07/127,279). The petitions<sup>12</sup> reveal:

A "courtesy copy" of a decision dismissing another<sup>13</sup> of the 11 "no decision" petitions (see the attached declaration of Jay H. Maioli) had been mailed to Mr. Maioli on August 31, 2005, and delivered to the firm on September 6, 2005, but he initially <u>set</u> <u>it aside</u> (emphasis added) owing to the necessity to meet imminent prosecution deadlines. Thereafter, my reports, that the USPTO website showed two petitions granted and no decision in the others, caused Mr. Maioli to believe that the decision he had received was one of those granting a petition, and to defer taking it up until September 27, 2005, when the existence of decisions dismissing petitions was first discovered.

Mr. Maioli has further explained that he received a courtesy copy of this decision on September 6, 2005, but this mailing was "not recognized as a decision dismissing a petition until September 27, 2005<sup>14</sup>."

The reason that Mr. Maioli did not realize that the decision was a dismissal was because he did not read it, and merely assumed that his petition had been granted. Mr. Maioli has stated that he received the decision, but he

11 The decision on petitions under 1.182 and 1.183 was mailed on February 6, 2006, to "Cooper & Dunham, 30 Rockefeller Plaza,37th Floor, New York, NY 10112," and was returned on March 6, 2006. 12 07/116,208, page 6, footnote 3; 07/447,078, page 6, footnote 3; 07/588,715, page 6, footnote 3. 13 This other application to which Petitioner's representative refers is 07/127,279. 14 07/127,279, page 2. See also 07/127,279, page 2, paragraph 3.

"initially set it aside owing to the necessity to meet imminent prosecution deadlines<sup>15</sup>." Mr. Maioli would have the Office determine that this conscious decision not to read the material which the Office provided to him amounts to an extraordinary situation, where justice requires the waiver of the rules.

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On September 27, 2005, when he finally got around to reading the decision which dismissed the petition associated with 07/127,279, Mr. Maioli realized that the decision was not a grant. At that time, he set about retaining a local service in Arlington to obtain copies of the other decisions which had not been received<sup>16</sup>. It seems likely that had he so much as skimmed the decision when he received it on September 6, 2005, he would have set about obtaining copies of the other decisions which had not been received, and an extension of time would not have been required for each of these related petitions. It is noted that the analysis contained in each of these related petitions was essentially identical, and as such, Mr. Maioli was on notice of each of the decisions which were not received.

This admission reveals that Mr. Maioli was indeed in possession of at least one of the decisions which he supposedly failed to receive - he merely was not aware that it had been received, because he decided not to read it. Mr. Maioli blames his mistake on an alleged error on the USPTO website, however had Mr. Maioli taken the time to review the mailing which was sent to him, it is almost certain that he would have acted on this matter sooner, and would not have required additional time to procure the additional materials. Failure to receive an Office communication and consciously deciding that one has more pressing matters to attend to are two very different situations altogether. Mr. Maioli would have the Office determine that he acted with diligence in responding to these submissions, but it would seem that consciously deciding to set a mailing aside without so much as glancing at the contents thereof is not consistent with the actions of a man who is acting in a diligent matter.

<sup>15</sup> Declaration of Jay Mailoi provided with the renewed petition on 37 C.F.R. \$1.183, page 3, paragraph 3, associated with application number 07/127,279. 16 Declaration of Jay Mailoi provided with the renewed petition on 37 C.F.R. \$1.183, page 2 of 07/116,208, 07/447,078, and 07/588,715.

As such, Mr. Maioli has failed to establish that he failed to receive at least one of decisions, and it seems likely that had he diligently read the decision which he did receive, he would realize that there were other outstanding dismissals which required his attention.

In a situation such as this, the Office normally would not extend the period of response so that he could introduce new evidence after the expiration of the period for response set by 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e). However, in the interest of judicial economy, since each of these petitions within these two groupings contains essentially the same set of facts, it does not make sense to evaluate some with one level of evidentiary submissions, and some with another. As such, the present petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.183 will be **GRANTED**, so that the same evidence will apply to each of these applications.

#### The petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e):

#### The standard

35 U.S.C. §41(c)(1) states:

The Director may accept the payment of any maintenance fee... after the six-month grace period if the delay<sup>17</sup> is shown to the satisfaction of the Director to have been unavoidable.

§1.378(b)(3) is at issue in this case. Acceptance of a late maintenance fee under the unavoidable delay standard is considered under the same standard for reviving an abandoned application under 37 C.F.R. §1.137(a). This is a very stringent standard. Decisions on reviving abandoned applications on the basis of "unavoidable" delay have adopted the reasonably prudent person standard in determining if the delay was unavoidable:

The word 'unavoidable' ... is applicable to ordinary human affairs, and requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> This delay includes the entire period between the due date for the fee and the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b). 18 <u>In re Mattullath</u>, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-15 (1912)(quoting <u>Ex parte Pratt</u>, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33

In addition, decisions are made on a "case-by-case basis, taking all the facts and circumstances into account." <sup>19</sup> Nonetheless, a petition cannot be granted where a petitioner has failed to meet his or her burden of establishing that the delay was "unavoidable."<sup>20</sup>

An adequate showing that the delay in payment of the maintenance fee at issue was unavoidable" within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 41(c) and 37 C.F.R. 1.378(b)(3) requires a showing of the steps taken to ensure the timely payment of the maintenance fees for this patent. Where the record fails to disclose that the patentee took reasonable steps, or discloses that the patentee took no steps, to ensure timely payment of the maintenance fee, 35 U.S.C. 41(c) and 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b)(3) preclude acceptance of the delayed payment of the maintenance fee under 37 C.F.R. 1.378(b).

#### Docketing error

A delay resulting from an error (e.g., a docketing error) on the part of an employee in the performance of a clerical function may provide the basis for a showing of "unavoidable" delay.

Such a showing should identify the specific error, the individual who made the error, and the business routine in place for performing the action which resulted in the error. The showing must establish that the individual who erred was sufficiently trained and experienced with regard to the function and routine for its performance that reliance upon such employee represented the exercise of due care. The showing should include information regarding the training provided to the personnel responsible for the docketing error, degree of supervision of their work, examples of other work functions carried out, and checks on the described work which were used to assure proper execution of assigned tasks.

A delay resulting from an error (<u>e.g.</u>, a docketing error) on the part of an employee in the performance of a clerical function may provide the basis for a showing of "unavoidable" delay, provided it is shown that:

(1887)); see also Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 U.S.P.Q. 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 143 U.S.P.Q. 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ex parte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913). 19 Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d at 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 982. 20 Haines, 673 F. Supp. at 316-17, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1131-32.

- (1) the error was the cause of the delay at issue,
- (2) a business routine was in place for performing the clerical function that could reasonably be relied upon to avoid errors in its performance, and;

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(3) the employee was sufficiently trained and experienced with regard to the function and routine for its performance that reliance upon such employee represented the exercise of due care.

See MPEP 711.03(c)(III)(C)(2).

An adequate showing should include (when relevant):

- statements by all persons with direct knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the delay, setting forth the facts as they know them;
- (2) a thorough explanation of the docketing and call-up system in use;
- (3) identification of the type of records kept;
- (4) identification of the persons responsible for the maintenance of the system;
- (5) copies of mail ledger, docket sheets, filewrappers and such other records as may exist which would substantiate an error in docketing;
- (6) include an indication as to why the system failed in this instance, and;
- (7) information regarding the training provided to the personnel responsible for the docketing error, degree of supervision of their work, examples of other work functions carried out, and checks on the described work which were used to assure proper execution of assigned tasks.

Portions of the Code of Federal Regulations and the MPEP relevant to the abandonment of this application

#### 37 C.F.R. § 1.362 Time for payment of maintenance fees.

(a) Maintenance fees as set forth in §§ 1.20(e) through (g) are required to be paid in all patents based on applications filed on or after December 12, 1980, except as noted in paragraph (b) of this section, to maintain a patent in force beyond 4, 8 and 12 years after the date of grant.

(b) Maintenance fees are not required for any plant patents or for any design patents. Maintenance fees are not required for a reissue patent if the patent being reissued did not require maintenance fees.

(c) The application filing dates for purposes of payment of maintenance fees are as follows:

(1) For an application not claiming benefit of an earlier application, the actual United States filing date of the application.

(2) For an application claiming benefit of an earlier foreign application under 35 U.S.C. 119, the United States filing date of the application.
(3) For a continuing (continuation, division, continuation-in-part) application claiming the benefit of a prior patent application under 35 U.S.C. 120, the actual United States filing date of the continuing application.

(4) For a reissue application, including a continuing reissue application claiming the benefit of a reissue application under 35 U.S.C. 120, the United States filing date of the original non-reissue application on which the patent reissued is based.

(5) For an international application which has entered the United States as a Designated Office under 35 U.S.C. 371, the international filing date granted under Article 11(1) of the Patent Cooperation Treaty which is considered to be the United States filing date under 35 U.S.C. 363.

(d) Maintenance fees may be paid in patents without surcharge during the periods extending respectively from:

(1) 3 years through 3 years and 6 months after grant for the first maintenance fee,

(2) 7 years through 7 years and 6 months after grant for the second maintenance fee, and

(3) 11 years through 11 years and 6 months after grant for the third maintenance fee.

(e) Maintenance fees may be paid with the surcharge set forth in § 1.20(h) during the respective grace periods after:

(1) 3 years and 6 months and through the day of the 4th anniversary of the grant for the first maintenance fee.

(2) 7 years and 6 months and through the day of the 8th anniversary of the grant for the second maintenance fee, and

(3) 11 years and 6 months and through the day of the 12th anniversary of the grant for the third maintenance fee.

(f) If the last day for paying a maintenance fee without surcharge set forth in paragraph (d) of this section, or the last day for paying a maintenance fee with surcharge set forth in paragraph (e) of this section, falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a federal holiday within the District of Columbia, the maintenance fee and any necessary surcharge may be paid under paragraph (d) or paragraph (e) respectively on the next succeeding day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or Federal holiday.

(g) Unless the maintenance fee and any applicable surcharge is paid within the time periods set forth in paragraphs (d), (e) or (f) of this section, the patent will expire as of the end of the grace period set forth in paragraph (e) of this section. A patent which expires for the failure to pay the maintenance fee will expire at the end of the same date (anniversary date) the patent was granted in the 4th, 8th, or 12th year after grant.

(h) The periods specified in §§1.362 (d) and (e) with respect to a reissue application, including a continuing reissue application thereof, are counted from the date of grant of the original non-reissue application on which the reissued patent is based.

[49 FR 34724, Aug. 31, 1984, added effective Nov. 1, 1984; paras. (a) and (e), 56 FR 65142, Dec. 13, 1991, effective Dec. 16, 1991; paras. (c)(4) and (e) revised and para. (h) added, 58 FR 54504, Oct. 22, 1993, effective Jan. 3, 1994]

MPEP 2515 Information Required for Submission of Maintenance Fee Payment states, in part:

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If a patent expires because the maintenance fee and any necessary surcharge have not been paid in the manner required by 37 C.F.R. 1.366, the patentee could proceed under 37 C.F.R. 1.378 (see MPEP § 2590), if appropriate, or could file a petition under 37 C.F.R. 1.377 (see MPEP § 2580) within the period set therein seeking to have the maintenance fee accepted as timely even though not all of the required identifying data was present prior to expiration of the grace period

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#### 2575 Notices

Under the statutes and the regulations, the Office has no duty to notify patentees when their maintenance fees are due. It is the responsibility of the patentee to ensure that the maintenance fees are paid to prevent expiration of the patent. The Office will, however, provide some notices as reminders that maintenance fees are due, but the notices, errors in the notices or in their delivery, or the lack or tardiness of notices will in no way relieve a patentee from the responsibility to make timely payment of each maintenance fee to prevent the patent from expiring by operation of law. The notices provided by the Office are courtesies in nature and intended to aid patentees. The Office's provision of notices in no way shifts the burden of monitoring the time for paying maintenance fees on patents from the patentee to the Office.

# Application of the standard to the current facts and circumstances

As set forth in the original petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b), Petitioner's representative uses an index-card based system of tracking the maintenance fees for the patents for which it is responsible for. Lewis Eslinger was the attorney responsible for the payment of the maintenance fees for this patent. When he retired in 1995, Mr. Maioli assumed responsibility for the payment of the maintenance fees for this patent<sup>21</sup>.

Petitioner's representative has no centralized department for ensuring the timely submission of maintenance fees – instead, it is up to each attorney to ensure that the maintenance fees are timely submitted for each of the patents for which he/she is responsible<sup>22</sup>.

When a Notice of Allowance and Issue Fee due is received in the law firm, a docket clerk opens a computer program and inputs the issue date. The computer program then calculates the due dates for the 3 maintenance fees, and generates 3 maintenance fee

<sup>21</sup> Original petition, pages 3 and 4. Renewed petition, page 2. 22 Dunham declaration, submitted with the renewed petition on 07/116,208, 07/556,443, 07/588,715, 07/597,332, 07/789,448 and 07/761,817, paragraph 8, page 4.

prompts for each maintenance fee due date - 3 months after the payment window opens, on the date the maintenance fee is due, and when the window closes. The docket clerk handwrites the 3 maintenance fee due dates on the Notice of Allowance and Issue Fee due, and forwards the Notice to the responsible attorney.

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When the letters patent arrives at the firm, the docket clerk will open the same computer program and double-check to make sure that the data was entered and computed correctly. The letters patent is then forwarded to the responsible attorney.

Once the letters patent is received, an index card is prepared for each patent. Each patent is listed on an individual index card. The index card is then filed in a drawer, and Petitioner's representative has a series of drawers arranged which correspond to particular dates. The index card is filed in a portion of a drawer which is assigned a date according to 3 years from the issue date.

When the 3-year period expires, the card is removed from the drawer and a letter is sent to the client, along with a list of all of the patent numbers for which maintenance fees are due. If no instructions are received to the contrary, payment is submitted to the Office. When payment is sent, the date on which the maintenance fee was submitted is indicated on the card along with a checkmark, and the card is moved to the file which corresponds to the time period during which the subsequent maintenance fee will be due.

With this renewed petition, Petitioner's representative has asserted that the index card was not created, and contradicts himself as to the identity of the individual who was responsible for the creation of the card. On page 2, he sets forth:

"...the legal assistant who at that time was assigned the duty of preparing the maintenance fee file cards for newly arrived Sony patents in our firm was Lourdes Valdez (emphasis added)..."

On page 5, he sets forth that "...Miss Peters (emphasis added)...did not make the maintenance fee index card." On page 4, he sets forth:

"in the case of the instant patent for which a maintenance fee index file card was not prepared, the legal assistant at the time issuance of the patent was, as previously indicated, <u>Linda Peters</u> (emphasis added.")

As such, the Office cannot determine whether Ms. Valdez or Ms. Peters was the individual responsible for the preparation of the index card.

Petitioner's representative has submitted an amended declaration of Mr. Phillips to set forth the efforts which have been expended to locate a plurality of docket clerks which were involved in the activities which led to the failure to timely submit the maintenance fee for this patent. Mr. Phillips sets forth that he "engaged an investigator" to attempt to locate Mses. Peters and Valdez, along with others<sup>23</sup>. The investigator merely obtained address records from the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, but did not procure any phone numbers.

It is noted that the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles might not have the current address of an individual who has since moved to another state.

Mr. Phillips reviewed the old personnel files of these employees, and retrieved phone numbers from the same. No mention has been made of any other searches which were performed for these individuals, by either the retained investigator or Mr. Phillips (such as an online search of various online directories) so it must be concluded that no other search was performed.

On October 20, 2005, Mr. Phillips telephoned Ms. Valdez, and the same agreed to discuss the matter with him on October 24, 2005<sup>24</sup>. Petitioner's representative has failed to explain why Mr. Phillips did not merely discuss the matter with her while he had her on the phone. Ms. Valdez could not be reached by phone on the agreed date, so Mr. Phillips waited until November 14, 2005<sup>25</sup> to attempt to reach her again. Why he chose to wait over three weeks before calling again, when such an important matter as a patent was at stake, has not been revealed.

On October 21, 2005, Mr. Phillips sent Mses. Peters and Valdez a letter via Express Mail<sup>26</sup>. On October 26, 2005, Mr. Phillips telephoned Ms. Peters, and the individual on the other end of the telephone line indicated that she would forward the message to Ms. Peters. Mr. Phillips later learned that this individual

24 Amended declaration of Phillips, paragraph 6.

<sup>23</sup> Amended declaration of Phillips, paragraph 4.

<sup>25</sup> Amended declaration of Phillips, paragraph 7.

<sup>26</sup> Amended declaration of Phillips, paragraph 5.

was Maryann Milletech, the sister of Ms. Peters. It has not been made clear when or how Mr. Phillips came to this realization<sup>27</sup>. On November 18, 2005, Mr. Phillips sent a letter to Ms. Milletech at the address of Ms. Peters<sup>28</sup>. Mr. Phillips was not able to confirm the whereabouts of Mses. Peters or Valdez.

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Calling a phone number obtained from an old employment record and mailing a letter **does not constitute a diligent effort to locate** an individual. There is no indication that Mr. Phillips consulted any directories (in print or online) or consulted any online databases in an effort to find Mses. Peters or Valdez. The decision on the petition under Rule §1.183 noted that Senior Attorney Paul Shanoski conducted an online search using LexisNexis® and found several potential addresses for these individuals, and the decision inquired as to what prevented Mr. Phillips from doing the same. It does not appear that Petitioner's representative has addressed this inquiry in the present renewed petition.

Petitioner's representative has included a declaration of facts from one Ms. Widenhouse, where it is set forth that Mr. Phillips requested that he perform an inventory of the Sony patents, to determine How many patents were assigned to Sony and named Maioli, Dowden, or Eslinger as a legal representative<sup>29</sup>. Ms. Widenhouse was also asked to review all the index cards that were prepared for this client<sup>30</sup>. It was determined that there were 526 Sony patents, and out of these 526 patents, index cards had not been located for 38 of them<sup>31</sup>.

#### Mr. Maioli has Failed to Treat the Expiration of these Patents as his Most Important Business

Petitioner's representative would have the Office determine that the failure to timely submit these maintenance fees in a timely manner was unavoidable. As set forth above, <u>Mattullath</u> makes it clear that in order to have the failure considered to have been unavoidable, Mr. Maioli must establish that he treated these patents and the revival thereof with the same level of care that

- 28 Amended declaration of Phillips, paragraph 11.
- 29 Widenhouse declaration, paragraph 2.
- 30 Widenhouse declaration, paragraph 3.

<sup>27</sup> Amended declaration of Phillips, paragraph 9.

<sup>31</sup> Widenhouse declaration, paragraph 4. See also Dunham declaration, submitted with the renewed petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e) for 07/556,443, 07/588,715, 07/597,332, 07/700,866, 07/691,817, and 07/789,448, paragraph 14b, page 7.

prudent and careful men would exhibit in relation to their most important business.

Mr. Maioli has established that he had other matters which he considered to have been more pressing than the matter at hand. As discussed above, Mr. Maioli has stated that he received the decision pertaining to 07/127,279 on September 6, 2005, but he elected not to read it until September 27, 2005. Instead of reading the decision, he "initially set it aside owing to the necessity to meet imminent prosecution deadlines<sup>32</sup>."

The maintenance fee tracking system which Petitioner's representative has instituted has failed to ensure the timely payment of a plurality of maintenance fees; Petitioner's representative has thus filed a plurality of petitions, in an attempt to revive these expired patents. Had Mr. Maioli treated these expired patents as his most important business, it seems that he would have been rather interested in immediately reading any decision which he received that pertained to any one of these expired patents. But such is not the case.

A prudent and careful man, acting in relation to his most important business, would not have received correspondence pertaining to his most important business, and set it aside so that attention could be focused on other matters, to the exclusion of the matter at hand, for the better part of a month. By Mr. Maioli's own admission, ensuring the revival of these patents was not Mr. Maioli's most important business. Mr. Maioli considered his most important business to have been meeting these "imminent prosecution deadlines," and as such, the Office cannot determine that the failure to timely submit any of these maintenance fees was unavoidable, as defined by Mattullath. The failure to treat this single issue as his most important business applies equally to each of these patents which have expired for failure to submit the maintenance fees, since this single issue is common to all. It follows that pursuant to Mattullath, this action precludes the Office from granting any of these petitions.

<sup>32</sup> Declaration of Jay Mailoi provided with the renewed petition on 37 C.F.R. §1.183, paragraph 3, page 3 07/127,279. See also footnote 3, page 6 of 07/789,448, as well as page 2, paragraph 3 of the March 6, 2006 declaration of Mr. Mailoi, submitted with 07/891,448.

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#### Petitioner's representative's Assessment of the Error on Renewed Petition is not Accurate

With this renewed petition, Petitioner's representative has set forth that the maintenance fee was not timely submitted because a maintenance fee index card was not prepared:

in the case of the instant patent for which a maintenance fee index file card was not prepared, the legal assistant at the time issuance of the patent was, as previously indicated, Linda Peters...for some unknown reason amounting to a clerical error, she did not make the maintenance fee index card.

Renewed petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e), pages 4 and 5

This is contrary to that which was asserted on original petition. On page 8 of the same, Petitioner's representative revealed that the index card had been located, and that it bore the wrong year for the due date for the 3<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>-year maintenance fee. Petitioner's representative further added that at some point, someone had made a hand-written correction on the card, correcting "February 28, 1993" to "February 28, 1994." Petitioner's representative even provided a copy of this index card: Exhibit A consists of an index card which bears the patent number associated with 07/447,078, and as well as the notation "3½ - 2/28/93" appears on the card, and it is clear that someone wrote a "4" over the "3."

It is clear that Petitioner's representative's explanation of the period of delay on renewed petition is not accurate. Furthermore, he has failed to address the reasons which the original petition was dismissed: he has not explained who made the incorrect notation, who made the correction, and why the receipt of the Notification of Refund/Non-Acceptance of Patent Maintenance, the Maintenance Fee Statement, and the October 6, 1998 Notice of Patent Expiration did not lead to an earlier rectification of this matter.

#### Petitioner's representative has Failed to Provide Statements from each of the Involved Parties

Petitioner's representative has not provided statements by all persons with direct knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the delay. No statement has been provided from Mr. Eslinger or Mses. Peters and Valdez. As such, any discussion as to their particular culpability towards, or inactions which led to the failure to submit the maintenance fee, amounts to mere speculation.

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §41(c)(1), it is the burden of Petitioner's representative to establish to the satisfaction of the Director that the delay was unavoidable. Petitioner's representative has been informed on numerous occasions that statements from these individuals would be required in order for the Office to determine that the failure to timely submit maintenance fees was unavoidable. Petitioner's representative has failed to provide these statements.

#### Summary

The search for the responsible employees fails to constitute a diligent effort. Petitioner's representative has again failed to reveal what prevented Mr. Phillips from using an online database to perform his search.

Petitioner's representative has filed conflicting statements as to the identity of the employee responsible for creating the index card.

Mr. Maioli failed to treat this patent as his most important business.

Petitioner's representative has filed conflicting statements as to the cause of the failure to submit the maintenance fee in a timely manner. On original petition, Petitioner's representative asserted that a maintenance fee was created, but the wrong due date was placed on the card. On renewed petition, Petitioner's representative claims that the card was not created.

Petitioner's representative has failed to explain who made the incorrect notation on the index card, who made the correction, and why the receipt of several communications did not result in this error being discovered.

No statement has been provided from Mr. Eslinger or Mses Peters or Valdez.

#### Conclusion

The prior decision which refused to accept, under 37 C.F.R §1.378(b), the delayed payment of the maintenance fees for the

above-identified patent, has been reconsidered. For the above stated reasons, the delay in this case cannot be regarded as unavoidable within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. §41(c)(1) and 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b).

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Since this patent will not be reinstated, Petitioner's representative is entitled to a refund of the surcharges and maintenance fees, but not the \$400 fee associated with the filing of the present renewed petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e), or the \$400 associated with his requests to waive the same. These fees will be refunded to Petitioner's representative's Deposit Account in due course. Telephone inquiries regarding *this decision* should be directed to the Senior Attorney Paul Shanoski at (571) 272-3225<sup>33</sup>. All other inquiries concerning examination procedures or status of the application should be directed to the Technology Center.

Charles Pearson Director Office of Petitions United States Patent and Trademark Office

33 Petitioner's representative will note that all practice before the Office should be in writing, and the action of the Office will be based exclusively on the written record in the Office. See 37 C.F.R. §1.2. As such, Petitioner's representative is reminded that no telephone discussion may be controlling or considered authority for Petitioner's representative's further action(s).